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One Bite at the Apple: Reversals of Convictions Tainted by 
Prosecutorial Misconduct and the Ban on 
Double Jeopardy 
Rick A. Bierschbach 
INTRODUCTION 
In a Pennsylvania community, a middle-aged schoolteacher is 
found dead in the trunk of a car. A massive investigation ensues 
and results in the indictment of a single defendant for first-degree 
murder. No evidence exists that directly implicates the defendant 
in the killings, and he adamantly professes his innocence from the 
outset. The prosecutor is convinced that the defendant is guilty but 
is frustrated by the lack of direct evidence and fears that he will not 
be able to secure a conviction at trial. He negotiates with a key 
prosecution witness to deliver damaging false testimony against the 
defendant and with a detective to "discover" evidence linking the 
defendant to the crime scene, At trial, the defendant - repeatedly 
contesting the truthfulness of the prosecution's case - is convicted 
and subsequently sentenced to life in prison. 
While preparing for appeal, the defense counsel discovers the 
prosecutor's misconduct. The appellate court reverses the convic-
tion because of the misconduct and finds that without the fabricated 
evidence there would have been insufficient evidence to convict. 
Nevertheless, the Government initiates a new trial on the same 
charges. The defendant then moves to bar the retrial under the 
Constitution's Double Jeopardy Clause to avoid the ordeal of a sec-
ond trial.1 
Given the uncertain relationship between prosecutorial miscon-
duct and the Double Jeopardy Clause, whether a court would grant 
the defendant's motion is unclear. Under the long-established rule 
of United States v. Ball,2 the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar 
the retrial of a defendant whose conviction simply has been re-
versed on appeal.3 Burks v. United States4 established the only ex-
isting exception to Ball when it forbade retrial after the reversal of 
a conviction on grounds of insufficient evidence.5 But the Supreme 
1. The Double Jeopardy Clause states: "No person shall •.. be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
The facts of this hypothetical case are based roughly on those of Commonwealth v. Smith, 
615 A.2d 321 (Pa. 1992). 
2. 163 U.S. 662 (1896). 
3. See 163 U.S. at 672. 
4. 437 U.S. 1 (1978). 
5. See 437 U.S. at 18. 
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Court also has recognized, albeit in the context of mistrials, that 
particularly egregious prosecutorial misconduct can and should trig-
ger the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause. In Oregon v. 
Kennedy,6 the Court held that double jeopardy prohibits retrial 
when a defendant successfully moves for a mistrial on the basis of 
prosecutorial misconduct intended to goad him into requesting the 
mistrial.7 When prosecutorial misconduct in the submission of evi-
dence provides the basis for an appellate reversal, however, double 
jeopardy jurisprudence remains undeveloped.s 
This Note argues that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial 
after reversals of convictions tainted by prosecutorial misconduct in 
the submission of evidence when two conditions are met: (1) the 
prosecutor intentionally introduced tainted evidence,9 and (2) ex-
cluding the tainted evidence would have left insufficient evidence at 
trial to support the defendant's conviction. This Note contends that 
this limited extension of double jeopardy protection is both man-
dated by the policies underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause and 
consistent with existing double jeopardy jurisprudence. 
Part I identifies the competing interests that the Court attempts 
to balance whenever a defendant invokes the double jeopardy ban 
on successive prosecutions. Part II examines the balance of inter-
6. 456 U.S. 667 {1982). 
7. See 456 U.S. at 679. 
8. Uncertainty among courts of appeals regarding the application of double jeopardy 
analysis to reversals tainted by prosecutorial misconduct has grown steadily since the 
Kennedy decision. The Second Circuit, for instance, twice has suggested strongly that Ken-
nedy's rationale should preclude retrial after reversal in cases in which a prosecutor antici-
pates an acquittal and avoids it by a deliberate act of misconduct at trial. See United States v. 
Pavloyianis, 996 F.2d 1467, 1474-75 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Wallach, 979 F.2d 912, 
916 (2d Cir. 1992). The Eighth Circuit noted in Palmer v. Clarke; 961 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 
1992), that the Court's double jeopardy jurisprudence suggests that retrial after reversals of 
convictions secured in part by prosecutorial misconduct might be barred in certain instances. 
See 961 F.2d at 775. Similarly, the Fifth Circuit recognized early on that the principle of 
Kennedy could be applied to "bar retrial where the [misconduct] caused a tainted verdict to 
be set aside, rather than a tainted proceeding to be aborted." Robinson v. Wade, 686 F.2d 
298, 307 (5th Cir. 1982). These positions are apparently contrary to those of the Seventh and 
Fourth Circuits, both of which have found that a defendant who did not move for a mistrial 
on the basis of intentional prosecutorial misconduct cannot claim a double jeopardy bar to 
retrial after his conviction is reversed on that ground. See Beringer v. Sheahan, 934 F.2d 110, 
114 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1006 (1991); United States v. Head, 697 F.2d 1200, 1206 
{4th Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 {1982). In Jacob v. Clarke, 52 F.3d 178 {8th Cir. 1995), 
the Eighth Circuit recognized this apparent circuit split as it again noted but skirted the issue 
of whether the Kennedy principle should extend to reversals tainted by prosecutorial miscon-
duct. See 52 F.3d at 182 ("[W]e need not dissect [the defendant's] ... legal theory to see if 
any part would state a claim under the Second Circuit's decision in Wallach. We leave for 
another day whether this court will follow Wallach, or the Seventh Circuit's seemingly con-
trary rule."). 
9. As used in this Note, "tainted evidence" refers to any evidence that the prosecutor 
knows is inadmissible at trial. The term thus includes· both falsified evidence, such as per-
jured testimony and fabricated test results, and nonfalsified evidence that is clearly inadmissi-
ble in a criminal proceeding, such as evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and 
seizure. 
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ests in two lines of double jeopardy cases - those dealing with re-
versals of convictions and those dealing with mistrials tainted by 
prosecutorial misconduct - and concludes that when the event 
triggering a retrial cannot be characterized as a procedural error, 
the defendant's double jeopardy interests generally outweigh those 
of the state. Part III argues that in cases of reversals based on in-
tentional prosecutorial misconduct in the submission of evidence, 
double jeopardy should bar retrial if insufficient evidence exists to 
sustain the conviction in the absence of the tainted evidence. 
I. DOUBLE JEOPARDY INTERESTS 
The fundamental tenet animating the Double Jeopardy Clause 
is that the State should not be able to oppress individuals through 
abuse of the criminal process.10 No single principle, however, de-
termines when the reprosecutiori. of a defendant is oppressive for 
purposes of double jeopardy. Rather, defining that point involves 
balancing the competing rights and interests of both individuals and 
society.11 This Part identifies and examines the interests contem-
plated by the double jeopardy ban on successive prosecutions. Sec-
tion I.A defines the protected interests of the accused. Section I.B 
defines the interests of society against which the rights of the ac-
cused are balanced. 
A. The Interests of Defendants 
The Court traditionally has viewed the Double Jeopardy Clause 
as safeguarding three interests of defendants: the interest in being 
free from successive prosecutions, the interest in the finality of 
10. See, e.g., Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 42 (1988) (acknowledging that the Double 
Jeopardy Clause aims to prevent governmental oppression); United States v. Martin Linen 
Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569 (1977) ("At the heart of [the double jeopardy] policy is the 
concern that permitting the sovereign freely to subject the citizen to a second trial for the 
same offense would arm Government with a potent instrument of oppression."); Charles L. 
Cantrell, Double Jeopardy and Multiple Punishment: An Historical and Constitutional Analy-
sis, 24 S. TEX. L.J. 735, 771 (1983) (characterizing the Double Jeopardy Clause as a "shield 
against governmental tyranny"); Monroe G. McKay, Double Jeopardy: Are the Pieces the 
Puzzle?, 23 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 18 (1983) ("[W]e can identify at least one core value [of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause] - protection of the individual from the government's use of the 
criminal justice system to harass and oppress."); James F. Ponsoldt, When Guilt Should Be 
Irrelevant: Government Overreaching as a Bar to Reprosecution Under the Double Jeopardy 
Clause After Oregon v. Kennedy, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 76, 87 (1983) ("[Protection of] citizens 
from governmental abuses of power ... is .•• the fundamental principle underlying the 
mandatory language of the double jeopardy clause."); George C. Thomas III, The Prohibi· 
tion of Successive Prosecutions for the Same Offense: In Search of a Definition, 71 IOWA L. 
REv. 323, 325 (1986) ("In the United States, virtually everyone agrees that [the double jeop-
ardy] prohibition is an essential part of an individual's protection against governmental 
tyranny."). 
11. Of course, this is not to say that the interests of defendants and of society are diamet· 
rically opposed. At the broadest level, society undoubtedly has a significant interest in ensur-
ing that the individual rights and interests of defendants are respected. 
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judgments, and the interest in having the trial completed in front of 
the first tribunal. This section examines each interest in turn. 
The most basic interest protected by the Double Jeopardy 
Clause is the defendant's interest in being free from the conse-
quences of successive prosecutions.12 Green v. United States13 best 
articulates the fundamental policy underlying this interest: 
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the 
Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its 
resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated at-
tempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subject-
ing him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to 
live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhanc-
ing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found 
guilty.14 
The accused has a fundamental interest in restricting the Gov-
ernment to a single attempt to prove his guilt at trial for two main 
reasons. First, multiple attempts by the Government to prove guilt 
seriously disrupt a defendant's personal life during trialls and thus 
provide a vehicle for severe governmental harassment of the de-
fendant.16 Second, repeated prosecutions increase the risk of an 
unjust conviction of an innocent defendant by wearing down the 
defendant and giving the Government new opportunities to learn 
from its earlier mistakes and to hone its trial strategies.17 
12. See United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 132 (1980); Manin Linen Supply Co., 
430 U.S. at 569; United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 346 (1975) (characterizing the prohibi-
tion against multiple trials as "the controlling constitutional principle" of double jeopardy). 
13. 355 U.S. 184 (1957). 
14. 355 U.S. at 187-88. 
15. See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503-04 (1978) ("[A] second prosecution 
may be grossly unfair. It increases the financial and emotional burden on the accused [and] 
prolongs the period in which he is stigmatized by an unresolved accusation of wrongdoing 
.... "); United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 608 (1976) (noting that the Double Jeopardy 
Clause protects a defendant against the "anxiety, expense, and delay occasioned by multiple 
prosecutions"); see also WAYNER. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
§ 25.l(b) (2d ed. 1992) (noting the burdens placed on defendants by successive prosecutions). 
16. See United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 470 (1964) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (" 'Har-
assment of an accused by successive prosecutions ... [is an example of when] jeopardy at-
taches.'" (quoting Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 736 (1963))); Gori v. United 
States, 367 U.S. 364, 369 (1961) (noting that the Double Jeopardy Clause applies to cases in 
which the defendant would be "harassed by successive, oppressive prosecutions"). 
17. See United States v. Difrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 128 (1980) ("[I]f the Government 
may reprosecute, it gains an advantage from what it learns at the first trial about the 
strengths of the defense case and the weaknesses of its own."); Arizona v. Washington, 434 
U.S. at 503-04 ("[A] second prosecution may ... enhance the risk that an innocent defendant 
may be convicted."). 
Judge Leventhal's description of the evolution of the government's case in Carsey v. 
United States, 392 F2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1967), provides a good illustration of how successive 
prosecutions may enhance the possibility of a defendant's conviction: 
[T]he Government witnesses came to drop from their testimony impressions favorable 
to the defendant. Thus a key prosecution witness, the last person to see appellant and 
the deceased together, who began by testifying that they had acted that evening like 
newlyweds on a honeymoon, without an unfriendly word spoken, ended up by saying for 
1350 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 94:1346 
Growing out of a defendant's interest in facing only one prose-
cution for an alleged offense is his interest in the finality of judg-
ments.18 Protection of the finality of judgments recognizes the 
value of the repose that attaches to the entry of a conclusive ver-
dict, whether in favor of or against a defendant.19 Thus, a verdict of 
acquittal represents a final judgment that frees the defendant from 
the specter of future prosecution.20 In short, finality contemplates 
"the importance to the defendant of being able, once and for all, to 
conclude his confrontation with society."21 In doing so, it seeks to 
define those instances in which retrial of a defendant constitutes the 
sort of oppressive governmental action that the Double Jeopardy 
Clause is intended to prevent.22 
the first time in four trials that the words between them had been 'firm,' and possibly 
harsh and 'cross.' We also note that the police officer who readily acquiesced in the two 
'hung jury' trials that appellant was 'hysterical' later withheld that characterization. This 
shift, though less dramatic, was by no means inconsequential in view of the significance 
of appellant's condition at the time he made a statement inconsistent with what he later 
told another officer. 
392 F.2d at 813-14 (footnote omitted). 
18. See Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 681-82 (1982) {"The Double Jeopardy Clause 
represents a constitutional policy of finality for the defendant's benefit in criminal proceed-
ings.'') {Stevens, J., concurring); see also DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 128 (recognizing that the 
Double Jeopardy Clause aims to preserve the finality and integrity of judgments); Arizona v. 
Washington, 434 U.S. at 503 ("If the innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a final 
judgment, the Constitution conclusively presumes that a second trial would be unfair."); 
United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971); Anne Bowen Poulin, The Limits of Double 
Jeopardy: A Course Into the Dark?, 39 VILI .. L. REv. 627, 639 (1994) ("The original purpose 
of the double jeopardy protection and its predecessors was to preserve the finality of 
judgments."). 
The notion of finality often is referred to as the primary interest protected by the Double 
Jeopardy Clause. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 92 (1978) ("[T]he primary purpose 
of the Double Jeopardy Clause [is] to protect the integrity of a final judgment.''); Crist v. 
Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 33 (1978) (noting that a primary purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause 
is "to preserve the finality of judgments"). 
19. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 15, § 25.l(b) (discussing the "entitlement to a 
sense of repose" protected by finality); Peter Westen, The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy: 
Reflections on Government Appeals of Criminal Sentences, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1001, 1051 
{1980) ("The [finality] interest is easy to articulate: it is a need for 'repose,' a desire to know 
the exact extent of one's liability, an interest in knowing 'once and for all' how many years 
one will have to spend in prison.'' (quoting Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 810 {1969) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting); and Jorn, 400 U.S. at 486)). 
20. See Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 682 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Sanabria v. United 
States, 437 U.S. 54 (1978) (holding that an erroneous acquittal constitutes a final, unreview-
able judgment); Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962) {holding that an acquittal 
that a judge improperly directed was final even though "based upon an egregiously errone-
ous foundation"). 
21. Jorn, 400 U.S. at 486. 
22. See LAFAVE & lsRAEL, supra note 15, § 25.l(b) ("Finality ..• looks ••. to the con-
cerns of protecting the defendant against prosecution oppression. • . . [T]he adverse conse-
quences of ••. governmental oppression .•. are checked in several different ways by a double 
jeopardy clause aimed at preserving the 'finality' or 'integrity' of final judgments.''); George 
C. Thomas III, An Elegant Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 827, 840 {"The 
potential for government oppression of individuals by multiple use of the criminal process ••• 
makes applying the finality principle to the process peculiarly appropriate. . • • The underly-
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Related to but separate from a defendant's interest in the final-
ity of judgments is his interest in his first tribunal.23 This interest 
encompasses a defendant's right to have his guilt or innocence de-
termined in a single proceeding by the initial jury empaneled to try 
him.24 Tue right stems from the Court's early recognition that if the 
Government simply could abort any proceeding that it perceived as 
going poorly, the defendant's protected interest in the finality of a 
verdict would be little more than a "hollow shell."25 Pre-verdict 
trial terminations deprive a defendant of the "option to go to the 
first jury and, perhaps, end the dispute then and there with an ac-
quittal."26 In doing so, they deprive the defendant of the repose 
that would have attached had the trial been allowed to run its 
course. Tue defendant's interest in a particular tribunal thus sup-
plements his core interest in final judgments by protecting him 
against governmental manipulation of process designed to prevent 
the initial fact finder from reaching a verdict in the defendant's 
case.27 
ing goal is prevention of government oppression; the goal finds its voice in the finality of the 
initial proceeding."). Consider also the statement of the Court in United States v. Jorn: 
A power in government to subject the individual to repeated prosecutions for the same 
offense would cut deeply into the framework of procedural protections which the Con-
stitution establishes for the conduct of a criminal trial. And society's awareness of the 
heavy personal strain which a criminal trial represents for the individual defendant is 
manifested in the willingness to limit the Government to a single criminal proceeding to 
vindicate its very vital interest in enforcement of criminal laws. 
Jorn, 400 U.S. at 479. 
23. See Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 36 (1978) (recognizing the defendant's "valued right to 
have his trial completed by a particular tribunal"); Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497. 503 
(1978); Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 471 (1973); Jorn, 400 U.S. at 484; Wade v. Hunter, 
336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949). 
24. See, e.g., Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 673 ("[O]ne of the principal threads making up the 
protection embodied in the Double Jeopardy Clause is the right of the defendant to have his 
trial completed before the first jury empaneled to try him."); Somerville, 410 U.S. at 471. 
25. See Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 673; see also Wade, 336 U.S. at 688 ("Past cases have decided 
that a defendant ... may be subjected to the kind of 'jeopardy' that bars a second trial for the 
same offense even though his trial is discontinued without a verdict." (citing Kepner v. 
United States, 195 U.S. 100, 128 (1904))). 
26. Jorn, 400 U.S. at 484; see also Poulin, supra note 18, at 634-35 ("An acquittal abso-
lutely eliminates [the possibility of retrial]. Therefore, the government may manipulate the 
first trial to avoid a probable verdict of acquittal and keep open the option of retrying the 
defendant."). 
27. As LaFave and Israel state: 
[T]he Supreme Court recognized at an early point that the protection of verdict finality 
could be subverted by actions that terminated a trial prior to verdict and thereby took 
away from the defendant his opportunity to gain an acquittal. If such actions invariably 
allowed the prosecution to retry the defendant, the finality of a likely acquittal could be 
avoided and the prosecution could be given the opportunity to regroup and try again by 
simply not allowing the trial to proceed to verdict. • • . Implicit in this protection is the 
recognition ••. that there must be a barrier to prosecution manipulation of a trial termi-
nation to give it another chance . • . . [This] protection ... was designed basically as a 
supplement to the core interest in preserving the integrity of judgments ..•. 
LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 15, § 25.l(b); see also Peter Westen & Richard Drube!, To-
ward a General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978 SUP. Cr. REv. 81, 90 (characterizing "the 
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B. The Interests of Society 
The defendant's interests protected by the Double Jeopardy 
Clause are not absolute.28 Balanced against those interests is the 
state's need for effective enforcement of its criminal laws.29 As the 
Court has recognized repeatedly, that need is satisfied by guaran-
teeing to society the right to one full and fair opportunity to prove a 
defendant's guilt.30 When circumstances at trial have denied soci-
defendant's interest in retaining the particular tribunal with which he began" as part of his 
"larger interest in finality"). 
28. A defendant's interest in the finality of an acquittal is the sole exception to this state-
ment. When "the innocence of the accused has been confinned by a final judgment, the 
Constitution conclusively presumes that a second trial would be unfair." Arizona v. Wash-
ington, 434 U.S. 497, 503 (1978). This presumption of unfairness extends to all dispositions 
that amount to acquittals, even those that are manifestly erroneous: 
[I]t is well-established that terminations deemed 'acquittals' cannot be appealed by the 
government. This rule applies to implied acquittals; to acquittals by the judge as trier of 
fact; and to a trial judge's judgment of acquittal in the face of a deadlocked jury. The 
rule holds even when an acquittal is due to trial court errors of law. 
OFFICE OF LEGAL PouCY, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO nm ATTORNEY GENERAL ON 
DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND GOVERNMENT APPEALS OF ACQUrITALS 41 (1987) (citations omit-
ted); see also supra note 20. The absolute protection afforded a defendant's interest in the 
finality of an acquittal is a consequence of "society's 'fundamental value determination ... 
that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.'" Donald Eric 
Burton, Note, A Closer Look at the Supreme Court and the Double Jeopardy Clause, 49 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 799, 814 (1988) (quoting In re Wmship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970)). Such absolute 
protection has caused both the Court and commentators to characterize acquittals as carrying 
special weight in the double jeopardy analysis. See, e.g., United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 
U.S. 117, 129 (1980) ("An acquittal is accorded special weight."); Westen & Drube!, supra 
note 27, at 123 (noting the "particular significance" that the law attaches to an acquittal). 
29. See, e.g., Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 38 (1988) (reaffinning the notion that the 
accused's interest in a fair trial must be balanced against society's interest in "punishing one 
whose guilt is clear" (quoting United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964))); Garrett v. 
United States, 471 U.S. 773, 796 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Decisions by this Court 
have consistently recognized that the finality guaranteed by the Double Jeopardy Clause is 
not absolute, but instead must accommodate the societal interest in prosecuting and convict-
ing those who violate the law."); Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 325 (1984) ("'[A] 
defendant's valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal must in some 
instances be subordinated to the public's interest in fair trials designed to end in just judg-
ments.'" (quoting Wade, 336 U.S. at 689)); see also Poulin, supra note 18, at 663-64 (noting 
that the "threat to the defendant's double jeopardy interests must be balanced against the 
public interest in full and fair prosecution"); Westen & Drube!, supra note 27, at 103 (stating 
that in each double jeopardy case involving successive prosecutions, "one must balance the 
defendant's interest in finality against 'the public interest in assuring that each defendant 
shall be subject to a just judgment on the merits of his case'" (quoting United States v. Scott, 
437 U.S. 82, 101 (1978))). 
This balancing approach often has been criticized by commentators. See, e.g., Thomas, 
supra note 22, at 832 (rejecting the notion that each species of double jeopardy cases requires 
a balancing of the defendant's interests against the government's interest in prosecuting 
crime); Sarah 0. Wang, Note, Insufficient Attention to Insufficient Evidence: Some Double 
Jeopardy Implications, 19 VA. L. REv. 1381, 1401 & n.130 {1993) ("[T]he Court's balancing 
approach has been criticized as uncertain and erratic . • • • Such an approach allows judges 
almost unlimited discretion in weighing the scales and determining the outcome."). 
30. See, e.g., Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 682 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("The 
defendant's interest in finality .•. must be balanced against society's interest in affording the 
prosecutor one full and fair opportunity to present his evidence to the jury."); Arizona v. 
Washington, 434 U.S. at 505 ("[The defendant's] valued right to have the trial concluded by a 
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ety that right, the need of society to vindicate its laws usually will 
outweigh the double jeopardy interests of a defendant.31 Justice 
H,arlan stated the rationale underlying this balancing approach and 
its centrality to the Court's double jeopardy jurisprudence in United 
States v. Jorn:32 
Certainly it is clear beyond question that the Double Jeopardy Clause 
does not guarantee a defendant that the Government will be pre-
pared, in all circumstances, to vindicate the societal interest in law 
enforcement through the vehicle of a single proceeding for a given 
offense. Thus, for example, reprosecution for the same offense is per-
mitted where the defendant wins a reversal on appeal of a conviction. 
United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896) .... The determination to 
allow reprosecution in these circumstances reflects the judgment that 
the defendant's double jeopardy interests, however defined, do not go 
so far as to compel society to so mobilize its decisionmaking resources 
that it will be prepared to assure the defendant a single proceeding 
free from harmful governmental or judicial error.33 
The State's right to a complete and error-free prosecution thus 
defines the boundaries of the defendant's interests. Although a de-
fendant is guaranteed freedom from prosecution after the comple-
tion of a single error-free proceeding, he is not guaranteed such a 
proceeding in the first instance.34 Indeed, when trial error deprives 
society of its right to attempt to prove the defendant's guilt in a 
single prosecution, well-accepted rules of double jeopardy dictate 
that retrial is almost always permissible.35 
particular tribunal is sometimes subordinate to the public interest in affording the prosecutor 
one full and fair opportunity to present his evidence to an impartial jury."). 
31. See infra notes 39-42, 56-62, 72-73 and accompanying text (describing instances in 
which the Court has held that society's right to a full and fair opportunity to convict the 
defendant outweighs the defendant's double jeopardy interests). 
32. 400 U.S. 470 (1971). 
33. 400 U.S. at 483-84. 
34. See Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 38 (1988) ("It has long been settled ... that the 
Double Jeopardy Clause's general prohibition against successive prosecutions does not pre-
vent the government from retrying a defendant who succeeds in getting his first conviction 
set aside ... because of some error in the proceedings leading to the conviction."); Kennedy, 
456 U.S. at 685 ("A defendant cannot be guaranteed both that there will be only one pro-
ceeding and that it will be free of error."); Westen & Drubel, supra note 27, at 103 ("[l]f the 
trial is tainted by an error ..• the defendant is not entitled to immunity from reprosecution, 
whether he proceeds by requesting a mistrial or by requesting reversal of his conviction on 
appeal, because immunity comes at 'too high a price' to society." (quoting Jorn, 400 U.S. at 
480)). 
35. For specific examples of such rules, see infra notes 39-42, 56-62 and accompanying 
text. 
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II. THE CURRENT DOUBLE JEOPARDY BALANCE: REVERSALS 
OF CONVICTIONS AND MISTRIALS TAINTED BY 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
This Part examines two lines of double jeopardy cases: those 
dealing with reversals of convictions on appeal and those dealing 
with the effect of prosecutorial misconduct on the permissibility of 
retrial after a mistrial. Section II.A discusses the rationale of the 
appellate-reversal cases and contends that current double jeopardy 
rules governing retrial after reversal fail to address the impact on 
the double jeopardy balance of intentional prosecutorial miscon-
duct in the submission of tainted evidence. Section II.B addresses 
the rationale of the cases concerning mistrials tainted by 
prosecutorial misconduct and concludes that the balance of double 
jeopardy interests weighs strongly in favor of the defendant when a 
mistrial is triggered by intentional prosecutorial manipulation of 
double jeopardy rules. 
A. Appellate Reversals of Convictions 
This section examines the current double jeopardy rules gov-
erning the retrial of defendants whose convictions have been re-
versed on appeal. Section II.A.1 elucidates United States v. 
Burks's36 exception to the traditional rule of United States v. Bat/31 
and asserts that the exception contemplates situations in which a 
defendant's double jeopardy interests are strong and society's inter-
ests fully have been served. Section II.A.2 examines the Court's 
limitation of the Burks exception in Lockhart v. Nelson38 and con-
cludes that Lockhart leaves unanswered the question of how inten-
tional prosecutorial misconduct in the submission of tainted 
evidence affects the application of the Double Jeopardy Clause to 
convictions reversed on appeal. 
1. The Existing Exception to the Traditional Rule: 
United States v. Burks 
Ball established the basic rule that the Double Jeopardy Clause 
does not bar the retrial of a defendant whose conviction is reversed 
on appeal.39 The Ball rule is premised on the notion that society's 
interest in a full and fair opportunity to convict trumps the interests 
36. 437 U.S. 1 (1978). 
37. 163 U.S. 662 (1896). 
38. 488 U.S. 33 (1988). 
39. See Ball, 163 U.S. at 672. 
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of defendants in cases of ordinary reversals for trial errors.4o Al-
lowing a defendant to escape punishment by taking advantage of 
ordinary trial errors would severely undermine that interest.41 
Thus, the Court clearly has maintained that requiring a defendant 
to stand trial a second time after a reversal based on trial error is 
not the sort of governmental overreaching against which the 
Double Jeopardy Clause is intended to protect.42 
Burks established the only existing exception to the Ball rule in 
holding that double jeopardy bars retrial when a defendant's con-
viction is reversed because the evidence presented at trial was insuf-
ficient to convict the defendant.43 A reversal on grounds of 
evidentiary insufficiency, the Court pointed out, is the functional 
equivalent of an acquittal at trial.44 The Double Jeopardy Clause 
must extend to such functional acquittals - "[t]o hold otherwise 
would create a purely arbitrary distinction" between defendants 
based upon the hierarchical level of the judiciary at which a finding 
of evidentiary insufficiency is made.45 
40. United States v. Tateo lays out what the Court accepts as the most reasonable justifica-
tion for the rule: 
While different theories have been advanced to support the permissibility of retrial, of 
greater importance than the conceptual abstractions employed to explain the Ball princi-
ple are the implications of that principle for the sound administration of justice. Corre-
sponding to the right of an accused to be given a fair trial is the societal interest in 
punishing one whose guilt is clear after he has obtained such a trial. It would be a high 
price indeed for society to pay were every accused granted immunity from punishment 
because of any defect sufficient to constitute reversible error in the proceedings leading 
to conviction. 
United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 {1964); see also Justices of Boston Mun. Court v. 
Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 308 (1984) (citing "fairness to society" and "lack of finality" as interests 
supporting the Ball rule); Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 326 {1970) (noting that the Ball rule 
pennits retrial of a defendant when "criminal proceedings against an accused have not run 
their full course"); LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 15, § 25.4(a); cf. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 
519, 534 (1975) (noting that any exception to the constitutional protection against a second 
trial "must be justified by interests of society"). 
41. Cf. Westen & Drube!, supra note 27, at 106 {"The essential teaching of United States 
v. Ball is that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit the State from retrying a defend-
ant following an erroneous conviction. The defendant's interest in finality must yield to the 
public interest in law enforcement." (footnotes omitted)). 
42. See Ttbbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 40 {1982) ("[R]etrial after reversal of a conviction is 
not the type of governmental oppression targeted by the Double Jeopardy Clause."); United 
States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 131 (1980) (noting that reprosecution after a defendant's 
successful appeal of his conviction is not an act of governmental oppression barred by double 
jeopardy); United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 (1978) ("[T]o require a criminal defendant 
to stand trial again after he has successfully invoked a statutory right of appeal to upset his 
first conviction is not an act of governmental oppression of the sort against which the Double 
Jeopardy Clause was intended to protect."). 
43. See United States v. Burks, 437 U.S. l, 18 (1978). 
44. See 437 U.S. at 11; see also Thomas, supra note 22, at 856 (stating that Burks recog-
nizes the equivalence of an appellate reversal for insufficient evidence with an acquittal at 
trial); Wang, supra note 29, at 1386 {"The Burks Court explained that an appellate reversal 
for insufficient evidence is the functional equivalent of an acquittal .... "). 
45. Burks, 437 U.S at 11; see also Thomas Collins, Note, Double Jeopardy: Evidentiary 
Insufficiency v. Trial Error After Lockhart v. Nelson, 1989 DET. C.L. REv. 283, 295 (noting 
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In reaching its holding, the Burks Court made an important dis-
tinction between the reversal of a conviction for trial error and the 
reversal of a conviction for evidentiary insufficiency.46 A reversal 
for trial error, because it "does not constitute a decision to the ef-
fect that the government has failed to prove its case,"47 is not the 
equivalent of an acquittal at trial. Rather, such a reversal is simply 
"a determination that a defendant has been convicted through a 
judicial process which is defective in some fundamental respect."48 
It is unclear whether the defendant would have been entitled to an 
acquittal at trial had the error not occurred - in the absence of the 
error, the State might well have taken some different course of ac-
tion at trial that would have resulted in an equally effective case 
against the defendant.49 Consequently, the defendant cannot claim 
that retrial deprives him of the benefit of a valid verdict of acquit-
tal. 50 The State, on the other hand, can claim that the trial error 
deprived it of a full and fair opportunity to prove the defendant's 
guilt.51 Because of the strength of the State's interests in such cases, 
retrial is permissible.52 
that, for double jeopardy purposes, no logical difference exists between an appellate court's 
finding of evidentiary insufficiency and an acquittal from a trial court). 
46. See Burks, 437 U.S. at 13-16. 
47. 437 U.S. at 15. 
48. 437 U.S. at 15. 
49. See Richard B. Lankford, Casenote, Double Jeopardy and Appellate Acquittal Based 
on Insufficiency of Evidence: Thomas v. United States, an Unnecessarily Broad Calculus, 10 
GEO. MAsoN U. L. REv. 559, 573-74 (1988) (noting that Burks is based on the notion that 
"the government could have provided other evidence at trial if it had not relied on an errone-
ous evidentiary ruling from the bench"); id. at 571 (further noting that "[t]he government will 
often have evidence on hand at trial which might have been used but for reliance on an 
erroneous evidentiary ruling by the trial court that admitted other evidence"). 
50. Similarly, the defendant could not claim that he lost the full value of his initial tribu-
nal because it is unclear whether that tribunal would have acquitted him in the absence of the 
error. Although the defendant's interest in avoiding a second prosecution remains substan-
tial, the Court repeatedly has made clear that those interests by themselves are not enough to 
invoke a double jeopardy bar. When the defendant chooses to upset a verdict on appeal, he 
also chooses to endure the second prosecution in order to afford society its one fair opportu-
nity to convict. See supra note 30. 
51. See Burks, 437 U.S. at 15 (stating that, when a conviction is reversed due to proce-
dural error, "society maintains a valid concern for insuring that the guilty are punished"). 
52. The Court has held that a similar balance of interests exists when a conviction is 
reversed because it is against the weight of the evidence at trial. Under Tibbs v. Florida, a 
reversal of a conviction because the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, unlike a 
reversal based on insufficient evidence, does not trigger a double jeopardy bar to retrial. See 
Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 47 (1982). This is because a reversal based on the weight of the 
evidence "does not mean that acquittal was the only proper verdict." 457 U.S. at 42. Rather, 
such a reversal reflects a belief by the appellate court that the jury improperly assessed ques-
tionable testimony at trial. See 457 U.S. at 42. At bottom, reversal of a conviction that was 
against the weight of the evidence simply gives a defendant a second chance to prove his 
innocence before a new fact finder. See 457 U.S. at 42-43. Just as it is in the interests of 
justice to afford the defendant a second chance at an acquittal, it is also in the interests of 
justice to afford the state its own chance to re-prove the defendant's guilt before the new 
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In contrast, if a conviction is reversed due to insufficient evi-
dence, the State "has been given one fair opportunity to offer 
whatever proof it could assemble" and hence "cannot complain of 
prejudice" upon being denied a retrial.S3 Because the defendant 
was entitled to an acquittal at trial, he has a valid claim that retrial 
would deprive him of the benefit of an acquittal and thus that his 
double jeopardy interests should prevail over those of society. Bar-
ring retrial simply affords the defendant the double jeopardy pro-
tection to which he was entitled from the outset of the case.s4 
Permitting retrial, on the other hand, affords the State a second full 
and fair opportunity to convict the defendant, thereby implicating 
the concerns of oppressive reprosecution that the Double Jeopardy 
Clause seeks to avoid.ss 
2. The Limits of Burks: Erroneously Admitted Evidence and 
Lockhart v. Nelson 
The balance of double jeopardy interests is different in cases of 
reversals of convictions due to erroneously admitted evidence. In 
those cases, the Burks exception does not apply and retrial is per-
missible even if insufficient evidence exists to sustain a conviction in 
the absence of the erroneously admitted evidence. In Lockhart v. 
jury. As Tibbs makes clear, the balance of double jeopardy interests in such a case is similar 
to that in cases of reversal due to procedural error: 
While an appellate ruling based on the weight of the evidence thus fails to implicate the 
policies supporting Burks and Greene, it does involve the usual principles permitting 
retrial after a defendant's successful appeal. Just as the Double Jeopardy Clause does 
not require society to pay the high price of freeing every defendant whose first trial was 
tainted by prosecutorial error, it should not exact the price of immunity for every de-
fendant who persuades an appellate panel to overturn an error-free conviction and give 
him a second chance at acquittal. Giving the defendant this second opportunity, when 
the evidence is sufficient to support the first verdict, hardly amounts to "governmental 
oppression of the sort against which the Double Jeopardy Clause was intended to 
protect." 
457 U.S. at 44 (quoting United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 (1978)); see also Hudson v. 
Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40, 45 n.5 (1981) (distinguishing reversals based on insufficient evidence 
from those based on the weight of the evidence and noting that "nothing in Burks precludes 
retrial" in cases of the latter). 
53. Burks, 437 U.S. at 16 ("[I]t is difficult to conceive how society has any greater interest 
in retrying a defendant when, on review, it is decided as a matter of law that the jury could 
not properly have returned a verdict of guilty."), 
54. See 437 U.S. at 16 (noting that "an appellate reversal means that the government's 
case ... should not have even been submitted to the jury"). 
55. Justice White in Tibbs v. Florida concisely stated the distinction drawn by the Court in 
Burks: 
The relevant question is whether the reversal is " 'due to a failure of proof at trial' where 
the State received a 'fair opportunity to offer whatever proof it could assemble.' " .•. 
[T]he relevant distinction is between reversals based on evidentiary grounds and those 
based on procedural grounds: Only in the latter case can the State proceed to retrial 
without offending the deeply ingrained principle that "the State with all its resources and 
power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an 
alleged offense." 
Tibbs, 451 U.S. at 50-51 (White, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
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Nelson,56 the Court held that an appellate court conducting a Burks 
analysis must consider all of the evidence admitted by the trial 
court, including that which was admitted erroneously.s1 Retrial is 
not barred as long as the quantum of evidence admitted at trial was 
sufficient to support a conviction, regardless of a finding that the 
evidence would have been insufficient to support a conviction had 
the erroneously admitted evidence been excluded.58 
The Lockhart Court looked to the rationale of Burks in reach-
ing its decision. The Court explicitly noted that reversal for the er-
roneous admission into evidence of a conviction that had been 
commuted was "beyond dispute ... a situation described in Burks 
as reversal for 'trial error' - the trial court erred in admitting a 
particular piece of evidence, and without it there was insufficient 
evidence to support a judgment of conviction. "59 As in Burks, that 
error did not necessarily entitle the defendant to a judgment of ac-
quittal. This is because "the trial judge would presumably have al-
lowed the prosecutor an opportunity to offer evidence" equivalent 
to that which should have been excluded at trial. 60 In such a case, 
society's interest in a full and fair opportunity to convict outweighs 
the double jeopardy interests of the defendant.61 Like Burks, 
Lockhart protects society's interest by characterizing a reversal for 
the unintentional use of inadmissible evidence as "trial error" and 
then recreating the situation that would have existed at trial had the 
error not occurred.62 
Lockhart provides little guidance, however, in cases of reversals 
due to intentional prosecutorial misconduct in the submission of 
tainted evidence. Lockhart dealt only with reversals triggered by 
procedural evidentiary error. 63 It thus contemplates instances in 
which a prosecutor did not intend deliberately to deceive the trial 
court when introducing inadmissible evidence. 64 Indeed, the Court 
56. 488 U.S. 33 (1988). 
57. See 488 U.S. at 40-42. 
58. See 488 U.S. at 40-42. 
59. 488 U.S. at 40. 
60. 488 U.S. at 42. 
61. See supra text accompanying notes 28-35. 
62. See Lockhart, 488 U.S. at 40-42, 42 ("Our holding today thus merely recreates the 
situation that would have been obtained if the trial court had excluded the evidence of the 
conviction because of the showing of a pardon."). 
63. See 488 U.S. at 40 (treating the situation as a reversal for trial error); see also Collins, 
supra note 45, at 283 ("[The Lockhart holding] was based on the majority opinion that the 
admission of a pardoned conviction was mere trial error ..•• "). 
64. Cf. William S. McAninch, Unfolding the Law of Double Jeopardy, 44 S.C. L. REV. 
411, 482 {1993) (noting the importance for double jeopardy purposes of the difference be-
tween a case involving a procedural defect that would prevent the public from obtaining a 
fair opportunity to convict and a case in which the prosecution is using the superior resources 
of the state to harass or achieve a tactical advantage over the accused). 
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itself recognized this important limitation on Lockhart when it 
twice carefully distinguished the Lockhart scenario of erroneously 
admitted evidence from scenarios involving deliberate prosecutorial 
misconduct and noted that it had "no occasion to consider" in-
stances of the latter.65 Thus, after Lockhart, the question of how 
intentional prosecutorial misconduct in the submission of evidence 
affects the application of double jeopardy to reversals of convic-
tions remains unanswered. 
B. Mistrials Tainted by Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Though unfortunate, Lockhart's failure to address the problem 
of intentional prosecutorial misconduct does not mean that analysis 
of the impact of such misconduct on appellate reversals of convic-
tions must proceed without guidance from the Court. The Court's 
mistrial cases provide an appropriate starting point for such an 
analysis, for it is in the context of mistrials that the interplay be-
tween intentional prosecutorial misconduct and double jeopardy is 
most fully developed.66 This section briefly discusses the Court's 
treatment of prosecutorial misconduct in the context of mistrials. 
Section II.B.1 examines the traditional rules governing the retrial of 
a defendant whose initial trial ends in a mistrial. Section II.B.2 ex-
plores the rationale of Oregon v. Kennedy67 and asserts that 
Kennedy recognizes the necessity of protecting a defendant's 
double jeopardy interests from subversion by intentional 
prosecutorial misconduct at trial. 
1. Traditional Double Jeopardy Rules in the Context of Mistrials 
Two fundamental rules traditionally governed double jeopardy 
protection in the mistrial context. First was the "manifest-necessity 
rule": in the absence of manifest necessity for the declaration of a 
mistrial, the State could not retry a defendant following a mistrial 
declared without the defendant's consent.68 By preventing the 
65. See Lockhart, 488 U.S. at 36 n.2. The Court pointedly noted at the outset of its opin-
ion that "[n]othing in the record suggests any misconduct in the prosecutor's submission of 
the [erroneously admitted] evidence." 488 U.S. at 34. It then went on to state: "There is no 
indication that the prosecutor knew of the pardon and was attempting to deceive the court. 
We therefore have no occasion to consider what the result would be if the case were other-
wise." 488 U.S. at 36 n.2; see also United States v. Quinn, 901 F.2d 522, 531 (6th Cir. 1990) 
(noting the Lockhart Court's emphasis on the lack of prosecutorial misconduct in the submis-
sion of evidence). 
66. See Ponsoldt, supra note 10, at 94-97 (surveying the development of the Court's treat-
ment of prosecutorial misconduct in double jeopardy mistrial cases); Westen & Drube!, supra 
note 27, at 85 ("[T]he Court has had more experience [with the problems of reprosecution 
following mistrial] and its analysis of this aspect of double jeopardy is more mature."). 
67. 456 U.S. 667 (1982). 
68. See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505 (1978) ("The prosecutor must demon-
strate 'manifest necessity' for any mistrial declared over the objection of the defendant."); 
United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824) (stating that a court may discharge a 
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Government from using a manipulative mistrial request to avoid 
the likely acquittal of a defendant,69 this rule protected the defend-
ant's double jeopardy interests in avoiding repeat prosecutions and 
in retaining the value of his initial fact :finder.10 At the same time, it 
protected society's need to vindicate its criminal laws by allowing 
the State to abort proceedings that suffer from irreparable proce-
dural :flaws.71 
The second rule was that, if a defendant himself successfully 
moved for a mistrial, the Double Jeopardy Clause would not bar 
the State from retrying the defendant.72 Like the manifest-neces-
sity rule, this rule protected society's interest in one full and fair 
opportunity to prove the defendant's guilt. That interest would 
have suffered if every defendant whose mistrial request were 
granted could have invoked a double jeopardy bar to retrial.73 
Over time it became apparent that a gap existed in the two 
traditional mistrial rules that prevented them from adequately serv-
ing the policies of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Combined, the 
rules allowed and encouraged prosecutors to skirt the manifest-
necessity test by engaging in prosecutorial misconduct designed to 
compel a defendant to request a mistrial.74 For example, a prosecu-
jury before a verdict has been rendered only if manifest necessity exists for doing so); see also 
Poulin, supra note 18, at 635-36 {discussing the application of double jeopardy to retrials 
after the granting of mistrials). 
69. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text. 
70. See supra section I.A. 
71. For example, when an error in an indictment creates a jurisdictional defect that ren-
ders a conviction reversible on appeal, society's broad interest in the effective enforcement of 
its laws outweighs the defendant's double jeopardy interests. See Illinois v. Somerville, 410 
U.S. 458, 471 (1973). 
72. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 93 {1978) ("[A] motion [for mistrial] by the 
defendant is deemed to be a deliberate election on his part to forgo his valued right to have 
his guilt or innocence determined before the first trier of fact."); United States v. Jorn, 400 
U.S. 470, 485 {1971) ("[A] motion by the defendant for mistrial is ordinarily assumed to 
remove any barrier to reprosecution, even if the defendant's motion is necessitated by 
prosecutorial or judicial error."); United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 467 {1964) ("If [the 
defendant] had requested a mistrial on the basis of the judge's comments, there would be no 
doubt that if he had been successful, the Government would not have been barred from 
retrying him."). 
73. See Jorn, 400 U.S. at 480 ("'[A] defendant's valued right to have his trial completed 
by a particular tribunal must in some instances be subordinated to the public's interest in fair 
trials designed to end in just judgments.'" (quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 
{1949))). 
74. The Court in Oregon v. Kennedy summarized the problem as follows: 
[T]here would be great difficulty in applying [the traditional rules] where the prosecu-
tor's actions giving rise to the motion for mistrial were done "in order to goad the [de-
fendant] into requesting a mistrial." In such a case, the defendant's valued right to 
complete his trial before the first jury would be a hollow shell if the inevitable motion 
for mistrial were held to prevent a later invocation of the bar of double jeopardy in all 
circumstances. 
Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 673 (1982) (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. 
Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611 (1976)). 
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tor who made a grievous tactical error at trial or who perceived that 
an otherwise winnable case was going poorly might have made un-
warranted and seriously prejudicial remarks in front of the jury. 
The defendant, not wanting to risk conviction in the face of such 
prejudice, likely would request a mistrial. If the judge declared a 
mistrial, it would have been with the defendant's consent, and the 
prosecutor could try a second time for a conviction in a new trial. If 
not, the prosecutor would have increased greatly the probability of 
conviction in the original trial· through his misconduct. By manipu-
lating the mistrial rules, the prosecutor had all but eliminated the 
double jeopardy protections to which the defendant was entitled.75 
2. The Rationale of Oregon v. Kennedy 
Oregon v. Kennedy76 recognized that such egregious 
prosecutorial misconduct is fundamentally incompatible with the 
policies underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause. Kennedy held that 
double jeopardy bars retrial of a defendant when a prosecutor en-
gages in misconduct with the intent of provoking a mistrial request 
from a defendant and the prosecutor is successful in doing so.77 
This rule prevents prosecutors from subverting a defend::µit's 
double jeopardy interests by manipulating the mistrial rules to 
avoid a probable acquittal while retaining the possibility of a subse-
quent conviction.78 At the same time, it does not discourage vigor-
ous advocacy on the part of prosecutors, as only intentional - not 
negligent - misconduct triggers the double jeopardy bar.79 
75. As Justice Stevens explained, a defendant who is the victim of such misconduct faces 
a no-win situation: 
[T]he defendant's choice to continue the tainted proceeding or to abort the proceeding 
and begin anew is inadequate to protect his double jeopardy interests. For, absent a bar 
to reprosecution, the defendant would simply play into the prosecutor's hands by mov-
ing for a mistrial. The defendant's other option - to continue the tainted proceeding -
would be no option at all if, as we might expect given the prosecutor's intent, the 
prosecutorial error has virtually guaranteed conviction. 
Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 686 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
76. 456 U.S. 667 (1982). 
77. See 456 U.S. at 679. 
78. Justice Stevens described the underlying reasoning of the rule as follows: 
The rationale for the exception to the general rule permitting retrial after a mistrial 
declared with the defendant's consent is illustrated by the situation in which the prosecu-
tor commits prejudicial error with the intent to provoke a mistrial .... There is no room 
in the balance of competing interests for this type of manipulation of the mistrial device. 
456 U.S. at 686 (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnote omitted); see also supra notes 28-31 and 
accompanying text. See generally LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 15, § 25.2(b) (discussing the 
rationale behind and application of the Kennedy rule). 
79. See Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 675-76 ("Prosecutorial conduct that might be viewed as 
harassment or overreaching, even if sufficient to justify a mistrial on defendant's motion .•. 
does not bar retrial absent intent on the part of the prosecutor to subvert the protections 
afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause."); cf. United States v. Ebens, 800 F.2d 1422, 1439 
(6th Cir.1986) (noting, in holding that a prosecutor's aggressive closing arguments were fair, 
that a prosecutor is permitted to strike "hard but fair blows"). Consider also the following 
observation: 
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Like other double jeopardy rules, the Kennedy rule attempts to 
balance the competing interests of the defendant and society. A 
defendant in a goaded-mistrial situation has a clear interest in 
avoiding retrial and retaining the possibility of a favorable judg-
ment from his initial tribunal: a prosecutor would be unlikely to 
engage in the misconduct if he did not believe that the jury would 
otherwise acquit the defendant and that the defendant could be 
convicted in a new trial.80 In contrast, the State's interest in a full 
and fair opportunity to convict the defendant does not suffer from a 
retrial bar: the prosecutor cannot legitimately complain, after in-
tentionally triggering a mistrial and thus aborting a fair proceeding, 
that the State's interest has been prejudiced if retrial is prohibited.81 
To give credence to that complaint would allow the State to take 
advantage of its own deliberate abuse of process to secure the "pro-
verbial 'second bite at the apple,' "82 a result that the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause and Kennedy forbid.83 
Because the American criminal justice system encourages vigorous advocacy, it is logical 
to assume that every prosecutor's act is generally intended to prejudice the defendant 
and obtain a conviction. The Kennedy decision holds that retrial of a defendant is not 
precluded unless the prosecutor acted with specific intent to achieve an end beyond the 
general intent to convict. Because the line between aggressive prosecution and harass-
ment/overreaching is vague and nearly impossible to define, the Court feared that in-
cluding overreaching in the retrial standard could serve to discourage aggressive 
prosecution, a result not necessarily in society's best interest. 
Cynthia C. Person, Note, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Double Jeopardy: Should States 
Broaden Double Jeopardy Protection in Light of Oregon v. Kennedy? 37 WAYNE L. REV. 
1699, 1706-07 (1991) (footnotes omitted}. 
80. See supra note 75 and accompanying text; see also BBNNBTI L. GERSHAM, 
PROSECUTORIAL MlscoNDucr § 11.S(b) (10th ed. 1995) ("[N]o prosecutor would intention-
ally seek to abort a trial when the chance of conviction was strong." (footnote omitted)); 
Westen & Drubel, supra note 27, at 94 (noting that the state might attempt to manipulate 
mistrial rules "in order to shop for a more favorable trier of fact[ ] or to correct deficiencies 
in its case"). 
81. The situation is contrary to that in Burks. See supra notes 43-55 and accompanying 
text. Rather than being deprived of a single opportunity to convict by an error beyond his 
control, the prosecutor essentially has forfeited that opportunity by using it to attempt to 
subvert the defendant's double jeopardy interests. See Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 686 (Stevens, J., 
concurring) ("[W]hereas we tolerate some incidental infringement upon a defendant's 
double jeopardy interests for the sake of society's interest in obtaining a verdict of guilt or 
innocence, when the prosecutor seeks to obtain an advantage by intentionally subverting 
double jeopardy interests, the balance invariably tips in favor of a bar to reprosecution." 
(footnote omitted)); cf. Peter Westen, Away From Waiver: A Rationale for the Forfeiture of 
Constitutional Rights in Criminal Procedure, 15 MICH. L. REv. 1214, 1255 (1977) ("[W]hile 
forfeiture rests on a balance between the defendant's interest in asserting defenses and the 
state's interest in cutting them off, waiver is thought to be based not on any such calculus of 
competing interests but on a concept of free choice."). 
82. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 17 (1978). 
83. Cf. West v. State, 451 A2d 1228, 1235-36 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982) ("[I]n the Machi-
avellian situation where the prosecutor deliberately courts a mistrial .•. the normal sanctions 
are self-evidently inadequate. A scheming prosecutor cannot be rewarded by being handed 
the very thing toward which he connives."). 
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III. PROTECTION FROM OPPRESSIVE REPROSECUTION 
AFTER REVERSAL 
1363 
As demonstrated in Part II, current double jeopardy jurispru-
dence does not provide clear guidance when a defendant's convic-
tion is reversed because the prosecutor intentionally deceived the 
defendant and the court by submitting tainted evidence at trial.84 
Lockhart dealt only with the accidental introduction of inadmissible 
evidence at trial and thus fails to address such a situation. Kennedy 
is likewise inapposite because it addresses mistrials related to 
prosecutorial misconduct rather than reversals. In the absence of a 
standard to govern the gap between Lockhart and Kennedy, a de-
fendant faces the unwelcome possibility of reprosecution in the face 
of an initial failed attempt by the State to secure an unjust convic-
tion at trial. 
To prevent such a result, this Part argues that double jeopardy 
should bar the retrial of a defendant whose conviction has been re-
versed due to intentional prosecutorial misconduct in the submis-
sion of tainted evidence when, absent the tainted evidence, 
insufficient evidence would have remained to support the convic-
tion at trial. Section III.A describes this standard and contends that 
it finds substantial support in the Court's double jeopardy jurispru-
dence. Section III.B argues that the balance of double jeopardy 
interests in cases in which section III.A's standard is met further 
dictates that the Double Jeopardy Clause bar retrial in that limited 
class of cases. Section III.C examines possible criticisms of section 
ID.A's limited extension of double jeopardy protection. 
A. A Standard for a Limited Extension of Double 
Jeopardy Protection 
An adequate standard for barring retrial should find support 
within the Court's existing body of double jeopardy jurisprudence 
and properly should balance competing double jeopardy interests. 
Those objectives are accomplished best by a standard barring retrial 
when two conditions are met: (1) the prosecutor intentionally in-
troduced the tainted evidence at trial; and (2) excluding the tainted 
84. For an example of such a situation, see the hypothetical case discussed supra in the 
text accompanying note 1. Consider also the notorious false·testimony case of Mooney v. 
Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935). Mooney involved a prosecutor's intentional suppression of 
evidence and use of knowingly perjured testimony to obtain the conviction of a defendant for 
first-degree murder. See 294 U.S. at 110. The defendant, who did not discover the tainted 
nature of the evidence against him until after the trial had been completed, petitioned for 
habeas corpus on the grounds that his conviction should be set aside. See 294 U.S. at 110. 
Because the defendant's petition focused solely on his due process claim, however, the Court 
failed to consider the implications of the prosecutor's actions for a retrial bar based on the 
Double Jeopardy Clause. See 294 U.S. at 111-13; see also Ponsoldt, supra note 10, at 93 n.93 
(discussing the Court's application of due process analysis to the Mooney line of misconduct 
cases). 
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evidence would have left insufficient evidence to support the de-
fendant's conviction at trial. 
The principle of Kennedy provides firm support for this stan-
dard. In arriving at its intent standard, the Kennedy Court distin-
guished between misconduct that should be treated as akin to trial 
error and misconduct that is so egregious that it implicates double 
jeopardy concerns.85 On the former side falls misconduct commit-
ted with a general intent to prejudice a defendant, such as reckless 
misbehavior, aggressive comments in a closing argument, and the 
negligent introduction of inadmissible and prejudicial evidence, as 
in Lockhart. 86 On the latter side falls the intentional misconduct 
that the Lockhart Court failed to address - misconduct that delib-
erately destroys the value of the defendant's initial tribunal.87 By 
analogy to Kennedy, double jeopardy should bar retrial when such 
misconduct succeeds in procuring a conviction that could not have 
been procured otherwise.88 
This standard also finds support in the rationale underlying 
Burks. If a defendant could not have been convicted in the absence 
of tainted evidence intentionally submitted by the prosecutor at 
trial, the principle of Burks requires that courts place the defendant 
in the position in which he would have been absent the misconduct 
and thus that he receive the double jeopardy benefit of his deserved 
acquittal from his initial tribunal.89 Had the court or the defense 
85. See Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 675-76 {1982). 
86. The Court stated: 
Every act on the part of a rational prosecutor during a trial is designed to 'prejudice' the 
defendant by placing before the judge or jury evidence leading to a finding of his guilt. 
Given the complexity of the rules of evidence, it will be a rare trial of any complexity in 
which some proffered evidence by the prosecutor or by the defendant's attorney will not 
be found objectionable by the trial court. 
456 U.S. at 674-75. 
87. See supra notes 74-75; see also Poulin, supra note 18, at 648 ("[I]ntentional govern-
ment (mis]conduct ... raises double jeopardy concerns because it manipulates the judicial 
process in order to prevent the defendant from receiving a fair trial with the first fact-
finder. "). 
88. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. In such a situation, the prosecutor has 
achieved exactly what he set out to do: avoid the acquittal of a defendant that would have 
occurred as the result of a fair process. As noted by the Second Circuit in United States v. 
Wallach: 
The prosecutor who acts with the intention of goading the defendant into making a mis-
trial motion presumably does so because he believes that completion of the trial will 
likely result in an acquittal. That aspect of the Kennedy rationale suggests precluding 
retrial where a prosecutor apprehends an acquittal and, instead of provoking a mistrial, 
avoids the acquittal by an act of deliberate misconduct. 
United States v. Wallach, 979 F.2d 912, 916 (2d Ci~. 1992) 
89. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. The Fifth Circuit has long recognized 
the logic of a limited extension of Burks to reversals of convictions tainted by prosecutorial 
misconduct: 
[T]he rationale of Burks [is not] inconsistent with application of the "prosecutorial over-
reaching" exception to bar retrial where the overreaching caused a tainted verdict to be 
set aside, rather than a tainted proceeding to be aborted. Burks' holding, resting on a 
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counsel simply discovered the misconduct at trial, the court would 
have excluded the evidence, the conviction would have failed for 
lack of evidentiary support, and double jeopardy would have pro-
hibited the State from reprosecuting the defendant.90 Failure to ap-
ply the Burks rationale in such· a case thus has the anomalous result 
of allowing a prosecutor to undermine both Burks and Kennedy 
merely by concealing his misconduct throughout the trial.91 Protec-
tions so fundamental as those afforded by the Double Jeopardy 
Clause should not turn on simply whether the Government's op-
pressive abuse of process is apprehended during or after a trial.92 
Finally, application of the Burks rationale to reversals caused by 
intentional prosecutorial misconduct in the submission of evidence 
perceived dichotomy between reversals for trial error and reversals for evidentiary insuf-
ficiency, indicated that, as the fonner hold no implication for the guilt or innocence of 
the defendant, they would raise no bar to further prosecution. . . . The extreme tactics 
which constitute prosecutorial overreaching offend the double jeopardy clause at least in 
part because they unfairly deprive the defendant of possible acquittal, by heightening, in 
a manner condemned by law. the jury's perception of the defendant's guilt .... 
Robinson v. Wade, 686 F.2d 298, 307-08 (5th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). Professor 
Ponsoldt makes a similar observation: 
In Burks v. United States, the Supreme Court unanimously held that categorical distinc-
tions between appellate reversals and mistrials in the context of double jeopardy law 
situations are not tenable. The Court's analysis supports the elimination of a distinction 
between mistrial and appellate reversal cases involving judicial or prosecutorial over-
reaching, at least where the overreaching was obvious and intentional and ... affected 
the defendant's fundamental rights .... 
Ponsoldt, supra note 10, at 92 (citations omitted). But cf. Beringer v. Sheahan, 934 F.2d 110, 
114 (7th Cir.) (stating that "a defendant who did not move for a mistrial on the basis of 
intentional prosecutorial misconduct cannot invoke the double jeopardy clause to bar the 
state from retrying him after his conviction is reversed on that ground"). cert. denied, 502 
U.S. 1006 (1991). 
90. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
91. In Wallach, the Second Circuit explained this difficulty while strongly approving of a 
limited extension of double jeopardy to reversals triggered by prosecutorial misconduct: 
[I]f Kennedy is not extended ... a prosecutor apprehending an acquittal encounters the 
jeopardy bar to retrial when he engages in misconduct of sufficient visibility to precipi-
tate a mistrial motion, but not when he fends off the anticipated acquittal by misconduct 
of which the defendant is unaware until after the verdict There is no justification for 
that distinction. 
Wallach, 979 F.2d at 916; cf. United States v. Singer, 785 F.2d 228, 239 (8th Cir.) ("The de-
fendant obtains mistrial only if the trial judge apprehends the sufficiently prejudicial miscon-
duct In reversing, the appellate court simply corrects the trial court's error."), cert. denied, 
479 U.S. 883 (1986). 
92. As Professor Ponsoldt notes: 
[I]n a case involving prosecutorial or judicial pverreaching, it should make no difference 
that the determination of overreaching is made on appeal as opposed to during trial ...• 
If courts fail to bar retrial, regardless of the level of review at which prosecutorial over-
reaching is found, government conduct will go uncensured, the integrity of the judicial 
process will be tainted, and the double jeopardy clause will be judicially undennined. 
Ponsoldt, supra note 10, at 92 (citations omitted); see also Singer, 785 F.2d at 239 ("The right 
of a criminal defendant not to be twice placed in jeopardy should not hang on which court 
correctly determines that misconduct infected the trial."); Robinson, 686 F.2d at 307 (noting 
the "strength of the criticism" that a defendant's double jeopardy protection could be af-
fected "simply by the point in the judicial process at which a charge of overreaching is found 
meritorious"). 
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is wholly consistent with the rationale of Lockhart. Lockhart rests 
on the presumption that inadmissible evidence accidentally intro-
duced at trial could have been replaced with other admissible evi-
dence of equivalent value had the State simply been aware of the 
nature of the evidentiary problem from the beginning.93 The same 
presumption, however, does not apply to cases in which a prosecu-
tor intentionally introduces tainted evidence at trial and deliber-
ately deceives the court and the defense. The appropriate 
presumption in such cases is that the prosecutor had no admissible 
evidence of equivalent value to introduce at trial. A prosecutor 
would not assume the serious risks of intentionally introducing 
tainted evidence at trial if he possessed admissible evidence ade-
quate to procure a conviction.94 The prosecutor's deliberate decep-
tions simply confess the actual weakness of his case. In such a 
situation, the Lockhart presumption is no more applicable than it 
was in Burks. Burks, of course, did not require a court to presume 
that the prosecutor had on hand additional evidence at trial that 
could have been used to remedy the insufficient evidence offered as 
proof of the defendant's guilt.95 
B. The Justification for Extending Double Jeopardy Protection 
In addition to finding support in double jeopardy precedent, 
section III.A's standard adequately protects competing double 
jeopardy interests by extending the double jeopardy bar to cases 
that involve the most egregious and deplorable governmental 
abuses of power. Intentional prosecutorial misconduct in the sub-
mission of evidence, like misconduct that manipulates mistrial rules, 
triggers serious concerns of state oppression through abuse of the 
criminal process. A prosecutor's intentional submission of tainted 
evidence all but guarantees one of two results for a defendant. 
First, the defendant faces a greatly increased risk of unjust convic-
tion and punishment due to the prejudicial effect of the evidence on 
the jury.96 Second, even if the prosecutor's misconduct is discov-
ered, under Ball the defendant faces the onerous ordeal of a second 
prosecution after his conviction is reversed.97 The prosecutor un-
doubtedly hopes for the first result. But even if his misconduct 
93. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text and infra note 102. 
94. Cf. supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
95. See United States v. Burks, 437 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1978). 
96. Cf. supra note 75; GERSHAM, supra note 80, § 9.4(f) ("[K]nowing use of perjured 
testimony .•• deprives the defendant of a fair trial ..•. "). 
97. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text. It is well-accepted that due process 
affords the defendant no remedy of a bar to retrial in such a situation: 
[D]ue process analysis focuses on the impact of nondisclosed or perjured testimony on 
the determination of factual guilt. A court finding a due process violation must overturn 
the unconstitutional conviction. Such a finding, however, does not bar retrial for the 
purpose of protecting the defendant from embarrassment, expense, and ordeal caused 
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leads to a reversal, under current law he remains secure in the 
knowledge that the State once again may put the defendant on trial 
after having failed in its initial attempt to obtain an unfair 
conviction. 
Concerns of state oppression are even more grave when, absent 
the tainted evidence, insufficient evidence would have existed at the 
original trial to sustain the defendant's conviction. In that case the 
balance of double jeopardy interests weighs heaviest in favor of the 
defendant, and it is precisely in such a case that the test articulated 
in section III.A dictates that the Double Jeopardy Clause should 
bar retrial after reversal. Under existing doctrine, the defendant in 
such a case faces a no-win situation similar to that of the defendant 
in the mistrial context:98 he either must endure a second prosecu-
tion at the hands of the State or accept a conviction that could not 
have been secured in the absence of the prosecutor's intentional 
misconduct. But the State cannot legitimately claim that a second 
prosecution is necessary to protect its own interest in effective en-
forcement of its criminal laws. The prosecutor has received the 
complete benefit of one full and fair opportunity to prove the de-
fendant's guilt. His decision to spend that opportunity deceiving 
the defendant and the court does not entitle the State to a second 
attempt at conviction; the trial was not .unfair to the prosecution.99 
Retrial in this instance merely would reward a prosecutor who took 
more than his share of the apple in the first place with a second 
bite. To prevent such egregious abuses of state power from contra-
vening both the policies and spirit of the Double Jeopardy Clause, 
courts should apply this Note's standard to bar retrial in this limited 
class of cases.100 
by governmental misconduct. Due process only limits the right to retry a defendant 
when there is a danger that the decision to reprosecute will be vindictive .... 
Ponsoldt, supra note 10, at 92-93 n.93. 
98. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanyin:: text. 
99. For the same reason, the prosecutor cannot ameliorate the damage done to the de-
fendant's interests by arguing that, because the state could have taken different action at trial 
had the prosecutor's scheme failed, the jury would not necessarily have acquitted. See supra 
notes 28-35 and accompanying text; see also Poulin, supra note 18, at 648 (concluding that, 
when covert prosecutorial misconduct results in the reversal of a conviction, society's interest 
in a full and fair opportunity to convict has been "fully served" by the trial). 
100. It is difficult to understand how the Double Jeopardy Clause legitimately can be 
seen as giving the state a "free shot" unfairly to convict the defendant. Cf. Ponsoldt, supra 
note 10, at 89-90 ("[I]n order to protect defendants from abuses of government power, courts 
should prohibit retrial in some cases [of appellate reversals of convictions]."); Poulin, supra 
note 18, at 651-52 (noting that the government's use of deceptive tactics to avoid a feared 
acquittal in the initial trial may trigger a double jeopardy bar to retrial and that there is a 
need for "a principled and workable standard" to guide courts in determining when defend-
ants who have been prejudiced due to governmental overreaching at trial should be 
discharged). 
The case of Commonwealth v. Smith, 615 A.2d 321 (Pa. 1992), provides a good analogy of 
an instance in which a limited extension of the double jeopardy bar is necessary to preserve 
the protections afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. In Smith, the Pennsylvania 
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This Note's test permits retrial, however, in the broader class of 
cases in which double jeopardy interests are more balanced. For 
example, retrial is permissible if, absent the tainted evidence, suffi-
cient evidence would have remained at trial to support a defend-
ant's conviction. A defendant in that instance has not been fully 
deprived of the value of his initial tribunal; it is not clear that the 
jury would have reached a different verdict in the absence of the 
misconduct. Because the defendant is not clearly entitled to an ac-
quittal, the State's vital interest in effective criminal punishment 
should prevail in such a case.101 This brings the case closer to the 
sphere of Ball and Lockhart, as opposed to that of Kennedy and 
Burks, making retrial permissible. Similarly, retrial is permissible 
when a prosecutor does not intentionally submit the tainted evi-
dence leading to a conviction. For example, a prosecutor might un-
intentionally submit a piece of evidence or elicit testimony that in 
reality is false.102 Presumably, the prosecutor could have addressed 
the evidentiary problem had he known of it at trial.103 This situa-
Supreme Court held that Pennsylvania's Double Jeopardy Clause protected defendants from 
retrial after the reversal of a conviction due to prosecutorial misconduct in the submission of 
evidence. See 615 A.2d at 325. Based on circumstantial evidence, the defendant in Smith was 
convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of a woman and her two children. See 615 
A.2d at 322. On appeal, the court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new 
trial in light of the improper admission of a number of unreliable hearsay statements by the 
trial judge. See 615 A.2d at 322. Some time later, the defendant discovered that the prosecu-
tion had withheld important exculpatory evidence and bargained with a key prosecution wit-
ness for false testimony against the defendant in return for favorable treatment on other 
criminal charges that the witness was facing. See 615 A.2d at 322-23. Upon a motion for 
discharge by the defendant after remand, the trial court found as fact that both instances of 
misconduct were committed by the prosecution. See 615 A.2d at 323. 
In light of the prosecutor's misconduct at trial, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court barred 
further proceedings in the case and discharged the defendant after finding that his retrial was 
prohibited by Pennsylvania's Double Jeopardy Clause. See 615 A.2d at 325. Finding that "it 
would be hard to imagine more egregious prosecutorial tactics," the court concluded that 
"the double jeopardy clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution prohibits retrial of a defendant 
... when the conduct of the prosecutor is intentionally undertaken to prejudice the defend-
ant to the point of the denial of a fair trial." 615 A.2d at 323, 325. In doing so, the court 
recognized that the societal right to one fair opportunity to prove a defendant's guilt in some 
instances may be forfeited by serious misconduct at trial. See Poulin, supra note 18, at 629 
("Through its decision, the [Smithj court foreclosed any opportunity for the Commonwealth 
to correct its errors and seek a new conviction in a trial untainted by error."). 
101. For a useful comparison, see the discussion of Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31 (1982), 
supra in note 52. 
102. Lockhart v. Nelson provides a good illustration of such a case. In Lockhart, 
"(u]nbeknowst to the prosecutor," evidence of a prior conviction submitted in support of the 
claim that the defendant was a habitual criminal was false because the conviction had actu-
ally been pardoned by the state governor. See Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 34-36 (1988). 
Nor was defense counsel or the court aware that the conviction was void - as noted by the 
Court, "it was mistakenly thought by all concerned that the conviction had not been 
pardoned." 488 U.S. at 41 n.7. The Lockhart Court assumed that, had the fact of the pardon 
been discovered at trial, the prosecutor easily could have corrected the error by submitting 
evidence of another conviction. See Poulin, supra note 18, at 642; Collins, supra note 45, at 
299. 
103. See supra notes 28-33, 59-62 and accompanying text. 
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tion is controlled by the trial-error rule of Ball and Lockhart as op-
posed to the standard proposed in this Note. Through no fault of 
the prosecutor, the error deprives the State of a fair opportunity to 
convict the defendant, and retrial is necessary to vindicate the 
state's interests.104 
C. Potential Criticisms of a Limited Extension of Double 
Jeopardy Protection 
There are three potential criticisms of this Note's limited exten-
sion of double jeopardy. First, critics might claim that language in 
Burks precludes such an extension. Second, one might object that 
Kennedy requires that the intent standard for an extension be more 
specific than that proposed in section III.A. Finally, an extension 
might be criticized on the ground that it raises insurmountable diffi-
culties in practice. This section examines and responds to each 
criticism. 
An initial objection to an extension of double jeopardy to rever-
sals of convictions tainted by intentional prosecutorial misconduct 
is that such an extension is effectively precluded by language in 
Burks. In distinguishing between reversals for trial errors and re-
versals for evidentiary insufficiency, the Burks Court noted that 
"reversal for trial error ... is a determination that the defendant 
has been convicted through a judicial process which is defective in 
some fundamental respect, e.g., incorrect receipt or rejection of evi-
dence, incorrect instructions, or prosecutorial misconduct. "105 
Based on this statement, critics of a double jeopardy extension 
might argue that intentional prosecutorial misconduct in the sub-
mission of evidence should be treated like any other trial error,106 
the appropriate remedy for which is the reversal of the defendant's 
conviction followed by a retrial under the rule of Ball and Lockhart. 
Both Kennedy and Lockhart contradict this reading of the lan-
guage in Burks. Burks's language only prevents an extension of 
double jeopardy if that language is read as being absolute, that is, if 
it is read as applying to all instances of prosecutorial misconduct, 
whether negligent or deliberate. In Lockhart and Kennedy, how-
ever, the Court explicitly recognized that deliberate prosecutorial 
misconduct raises different concerns than negligent prosecutorial 
misconduct or other procedural flaws that are akin to trial error.107 
104. See supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text. 
105. United States v. Burks, 437 U.S. 1, 15 (1978) (second emphasis added). 
106. Cf. Mary J. Fahey, Note, Double Jeopardy: An Illusory Remedy for Governmental 
Overreaching at Trial, 29 BUFF. L. RE.v. 759, 774-75 (1980) ("[A] defendant who wishes to 
argue that if an appellate court finds that overreaching occurred which provoked his mistrial 
motion, then a mistrial should have been granted and double jeopardy should prohibit his 
retrial, will have to combat the dicta of Burks."). 
107. See supra notes 63-65, 77-79 and accompanying text. 
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In light of this distinction, Burks's language should not be under-
stood as referring to deliberate attempts by a prosecutor to deceive 
the court. Rather, that language should be taken as referring to less 
egregious instances of negligent prosecutorial misbehavior and 
overreaching - such as unwarranted and prejudicial remarks in 
front of the jury - that frequently lead to the reversals of defend-
ants' convictions.10s 
A second potential criticism of this Note's double jeopardy ex-
tension is that analogy to Kennedy requires a more specific intent 
than is required under section III.A's two-pronged standard. Ar-
guably, Kennedy extends double jeopardy protection only to "cases 
in which the conduct giving rise to the successful motion for a mis-
trial was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mis-
trial. "109 This intent standard restricts itself to conduct intended to 
manipulate double jeopardy rules for the purpose of initiating a sec-
ond prosecution and does not encompass conduct that is merely in-
tended to avoid an acquittal or secure an unfair conviction from the 
jury. For an extension of double jeopardy to be consistent \vith this 
reading of Kennedy, it is not enough that a prosecutor deliberately 
submit tainted evidence at trial. Rather, Kennedy dictates that 
double jeopardy bar retrial only if a prosecutor's intentional mis-
conduct is aimed at triggering a reversal that would subject a de-
fendant to a second prosecution.no Section III.A's standard does 
not require such a showing of specific intent. 
108. As Professor Poulin observes: 
Generally, when a criminal case goes to trial, the prosecutor has some hope of obtaining 
a conviction. The prosecutor's natural instinct is to zealously pursue a guilty verdict. 
The number of criminal appeals pointing to prosecutorial improprieties reveals that 
prosecutorial behavior that undermines the defendant's rights and risks an unfair trial is 
a common occurrence in criminal trials. 
Poulin, supra note 18, at 659 n.161; see also Evans v. Thompson, 881 F.2d 117, 123 n.1 (4th 
Cir. 1989) (suggesting, based on the rationale of Kennedy, that the Double Jeopardy Clause 
would bar retrial after reversal for trial error "if the error was the product of deliberate 
prosecutorial misconduct"). 
109. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 677, 679 (1982) (emphasis added); see also Beringer v. 
Sheahan, 934 F.2d 110 (7th Cir.) (limiting Kennedy's retrial bar to situations in which the 
prosecutor specifically intended to provoke the mistrial request), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1006 
(1991). 
110. See, e.g., Steven Alan Reiss, Prosecutorial Intent in Constitutional Criminal Proce· 
dure, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1365, 1425-26 (1987) ("The [Kennedy] Court ruled that no matter 
how egregious, a prosecutor's misbehavior at trial will not bar a subsequent retrial so long as 
the prosecutor did not act with the specific intent to deprive the defendant of the protection 
of the double jeopardy clause .... "). One commentator summarizes the Court's focus on 
intent as follows: 
The [Kennedy] Court ... viewed [the defendant's] prime interest as the right to have his 
fate determined by the first tribunal. The Court pointed out that a deliberate sabotaging 
of a trial, intended to goad the defendant into moving for a mistrial, subverts that inter-
est and must be protected by a bar against retrial. That interest, however, is distin-
guished from the defendant's right to a fair trial, free from error. This latter interest is 
protected, not by the retrial bar, but by the availability of a mistrial or appellate reversal. 
Where the defendant's right to a determination by the first tribunal is at issue, the 
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This argument is flawed for at least two reasons. First, the 
Kennedy test is not necessarily as narrow as critics may claim. In-
tent to trigger a mistrial, intent to avoid a fair acquittal, and intent 
to secure an unfair conviction are merely specific instances of an 
overriding intent to subvert the protections afforded by the Double 
Jeopardy Clause by denying a defendant the benefit of his first tri-
bunal. These states of mind are nearly indistinguishable in prac-
tice, 111 and at least one court of appeals has included them all under 
the Kennedy standard.112 Thus, this Note's test, though it may be 
inconsistent with select language in Kennedy, is not necessarily in-
consistent with the principle underlying Kennedy itself. 
Second, even if the Kennedy test is as narrow as critics might 
claim, no reason exists for applying the same narrow standard to 
this Note's proposed extension of double jeopardy. The Kennedy 
Court based its narrow intent standard largely on the worry that a 
broader "overreaching" standard would greatly increase the 
number of mistrial requests and subsequent double jeopardy claims 
in trial courts as well as encourage trial judges to deny defendants' 
Court's focus is not on the error itself, nor on the position of the defendant as a result of 
the error. Rather, the Court focuses on the intent with which the error was committed. 
Person, supra note 79, at 1706. 
111. The objective circumstances that lead an observer to infer the existence of one of 
these states of mind likely will lead to the same inference with respect to the others. For 
instance, one observer rationally might conclude that oven and extremely egregious miscon-
duct was intended to cause the jury to convict a defendant, while another observer might 
conclude that such misconduct was intended to provoke a mistrial request. See, e.g., 3 Jo. 
SEPH G. CooK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGIITS OF THE ACCUSED§ 23:32, at 361-62 (2d ed. 1986) 
(discussing circumstances under which courts generally have found official misconduct to be 
"accidental or unintended"); Fahey, supra note 106, at 771 (discussing the circumstances 
under which a defendant has an "ideal claim" that a prosecutor intended to trigger a mistrial 
through his misconduct). Compare Justice Marshall's statement in his dissent from the denial 
of certiorari in Green v. United States: 
Regardless of whether the Government's misbehavior was designed specifically to pro-
voke a mistrial or was simply intended to reduce the chances of an acquittal, the net 
effect on the defendant is the same: he is faced with the burdens and risks of a second 
trial solely because the Government has deliberately undermined the integrity of the 
first proceeding. 
Green v. United States, 451 U.S. 929, 931 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
112. In United States v. Pavloyianis, 996 F.2d 1467 (2d Cir. 1993), the Second Circuit 
summarized the scope of Kennedy's intent standard as follows: 
[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause protects a criminal defendant from multiple successive 
prosecutions for the same offense that arise from prosecutorial overreaching engaged in 
with the deliberate intent of depriving him of having his trial completed by a particular 
tribunal or prejudicing the possibility of an acquittal that the prosecutor believed likely. 
996 F.2d at 1473 (emphasis added). But compare the following statement of the court in 
West v. State, 451 A.2d 1228 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982): 
Ordinarily, when the prosecutor injects error into the trial, grievous as that may be, the 
sanction is mistrial or reversal. It is only where the prosecutor deliberately subverts the 
right of the defendant to stay with the original tribunal that the double jeopardy bar 
becomes the appropriate relief. [Kennedy distinguished] not between grave error and 
lesser error and not between intended error and unintended error, but rather between 
deliberate error designed to accomplish Purpose A and deliberate error designed to ac-
complish purpose B •.•. 
451 A.2d at 1234. 
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mistrial requests.113 That concern is unique to Kennedy's mistrial 
context; no similar worry exists with respect to the intentional sub-
mission of tainted evidence when the remaining evidence would 
have been inadequate to support a conviction. Unless the tainted 
evidence is instrumental in securing a conviction, 114 defendants will 
have little incentive to raise claims of deliberate prosecutorial mis-
conduct on appeal with an eye toward raising a subsequent double 
jeopardy bar to retrial. For the same reason, appellate courts will 
not face the specter of possible double jeopardy claims in every 
case of reversal for prosecutorial misconduct. Consequently, the 
pragmatic considerations that make a narrow test necessary in the 
context of Kennedy - fear of incessant claims of "government 
overreaching" - are inapplicable to this Note's standard. 
A final objection to the extension of double jeopardy proposed 
herein is that it creates serious difficulties in practice. Critics may 
argue, for instance, that appellate courts cannot adequately dis-
cover and assess evidence of governmental intent in applying this 
Note's standard.115 Similarly, it may be objected that the extension 
will discourage vigorous advocacy on the part of prosecutors by 
making them reluctant to submit evidence of questionable admissi-
bility or to call witnesses of uncertain integrity at trial. Finally, one 
may criticize an extension on the ground that courts will be ex-
tremely hesitant to make open findings of serious overreaching 
against prosecutors and that such :findings may only serve to wound 
the integrity of and undermine respect for the criminal justice 
system.116 
None of these problems is serious enough to defeat the exten-
sion of double jeopardy proposed in section III.A. Appellate 
courts should have little difficulty applying this Note's intent stan-
dard - appellate judges are well-accustomed to inferring subjec-
tive intent from objective circumstances, and any possible 
difficulties in proving and assessing governmental intent would be 
113. See Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 676 ("Knowing that the granting of the defendant's motion 
for mistrial would all but inevitably bring with it an attempt to bar a second trial on grounds 
of double jeopardy, the judge presiding over the first trial might well be more loath to grant a 
defendant's motion for mistrial.") (rejecting broader overreaching standard for triggering 
double jeopardy bar to retrial); see also LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 15, § 25.2(b) (noting 
two considerations influencing the Court in adopting the narrow test of Kennedy: first, that a 
broader overreaching standard would "be at issue in virtually every case" and second, that "a 
broader test would be counterproductive because it would influence the denial of mistrial 
requests"); Fahey, supra note 106, at 772 (noting that the Court recognized that a broader 
standard might cause appellate courts to refuse to find the necessary conditions for triggering 
a double jeopardy bar for fear of that result becoming commonplace). 
114. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
115. See Poulin, supra note 18, at 653 (discussing problems with intent-based tests). 
116. Cf. Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 483 n.1 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
("[T]he relations between judges and prosecutors in many places may make judges reluctant 
to find intentional manipulation."). 
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no greater than those in other intent determinations.117 Moreover, 
because the extension applies only to deliberate misconduct, it will 
not discourage vigorous advocacy on the part of prosecutors.11s 
Admittedly, a double jeopardy extension does require a willingness 
by courts to make damaging :findings against prosecutors who en-
gage in misconduct, but the possibility that a court will be reluctant 
to make such :findings is insufficient to outweigh a defendant's in-
terest in a fair trial, free of prosecutorial misconduct.119 
CONCLUSION 
To many observers, the modem American criminal justice sys-
tem more closely resembles a laboring and overburdened machine 
than a well-oiled instrument of state oppression. Ever-increasing 
caseloads, decreasing budgets, and an emphasis on the rights of the 
accused might cause some observers to dismiss fears of governmen-
tal abuse as unfounded.120 Nevertheless, governmental power re-
mains awesome when selectively, employed, and the potential for 
abuse in any given case is "virtually unlimited."121 
As gatekeepers to such overwhelming power, prosecutors shoul-
der a massive responsibility.122 Even the most well-meaning prose-
117. See Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 680 {Powell, J., concurring) (noting that a court can and 
should "rely primarily upon the objective facts and circumstances of [a] particular case" in 
determining whether the requisite intent exists). See generally GERSHAM, supra note 80, 
§ 11.8(d)-(e) {discussing proof of prosecutorial intent under objective and subjective 
standards). 
118. For example, a prosecutor would have no disincentive to call a witness of questiona-
ble integrity for fear that, should the witness perjure himself on the stand, a reversal of the 
defendant's conviction on that ground would bar retrial. In the absence of prosecutorial 
intent that the witness perjure himself, the limited extension of double jeopardy proposed in 
this Note would not apply. 
119. Indeed, allowing a prosecutor's misconduct to go uncensured can have serious social 
consequences quite apart from undermining a defendant's double jeopardy interests at trial: 
Lawless enforcement of the law [by the] officials most definitely responsible for law 
enforcement causes public disrespect for the entire legal process. When judges and pros-
ecutors violate their sworn oaths, and engage in unethical conduct that deprives a de-
fendant of a full and fair trial, the defendant is not the only victim - the jurors, 
spectators, and the public become aware that the law can be violated with impunity in 
the courtroom, by those sworn to protect and uphold it. 
NATIONAL COMM. ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN 
LAW ENFORCEMENT 268 {1931). 
120. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Jeopardy and Mistrials, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 449, 505 
(1977). 
121. See id. 
122. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 696 {1985) {Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The 
prosecutor is by trade, if not necessity, a zealous advocate. . . . At the same time, as a repre-
sentative of the state, he must place foremost in his hierarchy of interests the determination 
of truth."); see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1982) ("The 
responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek 
justice, not merely to convict."); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 cmt. 
{1992) ("A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an 
advocate."). 
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cutor can far overstep the bounds of justice in his zeal to further the 
interests of the state in effective criminal punishment. When that 
happens, the Double Jeopardy Clause should stand ready to work 
as a shield for the accused and protect him from prosecutorial mis-
con1duct that so undermines fundamental tenets of justice as to im-
plicate values enshrined in the Constitution. The Clause can hardly 
fulfill this function as long as its implications for misconduct in the 
context of reversals of convictions remain ill-understood and largely 
unaddressed. This Note by no means settles all of the issues that 
may confront a court as it applies the Double Jeopardy Clause to 
reversals of convictions tainted by prosecutorial misconduct. It 
does, however, establish an effective analytical framework to guide 
a court in determining when prosecutorial misconduct in the sub-
mission of evidence implicates double jeopardy concerns. Still, 
more than a theoretical understanding of double jeopardy is needed 
to protect defendants from egregious prosecutorial misconduct. 
Until courts bear the difficult burden of transforming theory into 
practice, double jeopardy protection against one of the most con-
demnable state practices - the making of repeated, unfair at-
tempts to visit criminal sanctions upon an individual - will remain 
a largely illusory guarantee.123 
123. See Fahey, supra note 106, at 761, 772 (noting the "general reluctance [of courts] to 
prohibit retrial in cases of governmental overreaching" and the hesitancy to subject prosecu-
tors and the judicial system as a whole to the severe consequences and criticism that attend 
findings of misconduct and abuse); Eric Loeb et al., Project, Twenty-Fourth Annual Review of 
Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1993-1994, 83 GEO. 
L.J. 839, 1044 n.1488 (1995) ("The circuits are reluctant to find the intent necessary to satisfy 
the Kennedy standard."); Poulin, supra note 18, at 646 (stating that no courts have extended 
double jeopardy protection to cases reversed on appeal on grounds that would have impli-
cated Kennedy at trial). Consider also the Court's observation in Green v. United States: 
The right not to be placed in jeopardy more than once for the same offense is a vital 
safeguard in our society, one that was dearly won and one that should continue to be 
highly valued. If such great constitutional protections are given a narrow, grudging ap-
plication they are deprived of much of their significance. 
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 198 (1957). 
